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ABSTRACT
There is a growing literature on the differential impact of "soft" vs. "hard" information on
organizational structure and behavior. This study is an attempt to empirically quantify the value of
soft information, using a data-base on the market for screenplays. Script quality is difficult to
estimate without subjective evaluation. Therefore soft information should be an integral part of the
pricing of these intellectual assets. In our empirical analysis, we find that "hard information"
(reputation) variables as well as "soft information" proxies are priced. Screenplays with high soft
information content are priced significantly lower than "high concept" "harder information"- type
scripts. We also follow the screenplays to production, and find that buyers seem to be able to
forecast the success of a script, paying more for screenplays resulting in more successful films. In
other words, "high concept" (harder information) screenplays sell for more and result in more
successful movies.
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I I. .   I IN NT TR RO OD DU UC CT TI IO ON N   
   
There is a growing literature on the role of soft information in organizations.
2 The 
theoretical literature focuses on the impact of soft information on organizational 
structure, whereas most of the testing was done in the banking sector. Stein (2002) 
suggests that in the presence of soft information, decentralization can allow good projects 
to be funded properly. He defines soft information as the ability to credibly communicate 
information to an outsider – in this case, a CEO. Faure Grimaud et al. (2002) consider an 
organizational structure with a principal, supervisor and agents. The information structure 
is nested, and as in Stein (2002), soft information in this context means information that 
cannot be credibly communicated to an outside agent. The paper itself is concerned with 
coalition formation and collusion, and develops an optimal organizational structure.  
Important recent applications of the concept of soft information have focused on 
the banking industry. Petersen (2002) suggests that soft information has been in the 
background but not necessarily the foreground of various theoretical papers, including the 
ones we mentioned. His survey discusses empirical work, suggesting that small banks 
tend to prefer to work with soft information whereas larger banks work better with harder 
information. Empirical tests show that firms that are less informationally transparent have 
a lower probability of loan approval. Further, such firms tend to do better with smaller 
banks that can better evaluate soft information. Berger et al. (2003) is the most recent 
paper finding support for this view using a matched sample of banks and firms. The 
banking literature also relates soft information issues to distance between the bank and 
the firm in question.
3 Similarly, Liberti (2002) finds that a more decentralized structure 
increases reliance on soft information in Argentinean banks, consistent with Stein’s 
(2002) characterization.  
Petersen (2002) provides some specific characterization of hard information; hard 
information is numerical, it is gathered in an impersonal way, and it is valued the same 
way by different people. He suggests that markets have recently been using less soft 
information, and he also relates it ultimately to the relative costs of quantification. In 
                                                 
2 See, for example  Stein (2002), Faure, Grimaud, Laffont and Matrimont  (2002) and in a less formal sense 
Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (1994), and Laffont and Tirole (1997). 
3 See Petersen and Rajan (1994), Petersen and Rajan (2002) in addition to Berger et al. (2003).   2
contrast, Baker et al. (1994) suggest that contracts based upon subjective assessments can 
improve upon objective contracts, regardless of relative costs. The paper argues that there 
is some aspect of value-relevant performance that is too complex to quantify, hence 
objective measures are imperfect and subjective measures can help. This characterization 
is perhaps closer to the notion presented in this paper. We propose a slightly more formal 
definition of soft information, and we use this as the basis for testing the proposition that 
the fundamentally subjective nature of soft information itself affects valuation. Our 
empirical analysis focuses on the film industry – a setting in which the inputs to the 
decision-making process have a high level of soft information. We use a unique data set 
to study the impact of the information content on the pricing of screenplays and 
ultimately, on the success of the movies that are produced based upon these scripts. 
 
I II I. .   A A   C CO ON NC CE EP PT TU UA AL L   M MO OD DE EL L   O OF F   S SO OF FT T   I IN NF FO OR RM MA AT TI IO ON N   
Consider a simple decision model with data inputs and a single output – a yes or 
no decision, such as loan approval, project funding, script purchase, a decision to operate 
on a patient, or a choice to hire an employee. Data inputs may take many forms: 
narrative, visual, numeric or verbal. A strictly quantitative model relies solely on 
numerical data as inputs. Quantitative models may also include hedonic specifications 
that code qualitative inputs into quantitative values. Visual, narrative and verbal data 
cannot easily be adapted to such a model unless they can be systematically coded – that 
is, the data can be mechanically and unambiguously translated into a numeric code. 
Mathematical functions can process quantitative information, but humans (i.e. human 
cognitive functions) are needed to process the additional signals. Thus soft information 
can either be defined as non-numeric input to a decision-making process or it can be 
regarded as data for which human cognition is required to convert it into decision-
relevant information. One distinctive feature of soft information is that the need for 
human cognition means that no two functional mappings will precisely match due to the 
fact that no two people are alike.  
For example, in a home mortgage approval decision, inputs might include the 
income and financial assets of the borrower, the loan to value ratio, and an extended 
discussion with a bank officer regarding the plans for use of the proceeds from the loan.   3
The clear quantitative inputs are the income and financial assets. The loan to value ratio 
[LTV] in fact shares some of the characteristics of a soft information variable, since, 
although quantitative, it relies upon the subjective evaluation of a property appraiser. 
However, most economists interested in soft information would regard the LTV as hard 
information because it is ultimately numeric. The conversation with the loan officer is 
archetypical soft information – it is potentially relevant to the decision, but not mapped 
explicitly into a number such as “the officer’s numeric assessment of the probability of 
default.” If, in this example, the bank finds that its loan decisions are better [i.e. the NPV 
is greater] when they include a conversation between an officer and the borrower, then 
soft information is value-relevant to the model. In this example, the conversation is the 
soft information, and the bank officer supplies the human cognitive processing function. 
Thus, the difference between hard information and soft information must lie not only 
with the information itself, but the processor needed to use it.  
Another way of thinking about soft information is simply as the opposite of hard 
information. Perhaps it is the fuzziness or noise in a quantitative model or specification 
that cannot be reduced through collecting more data. Consider, for example, a point on a 
two dimensional plane with coordinates (x, y) and a sender of a message and a receiver. 
The sender sends a message and the receiver is trying to identify the point. If the 
information enables any receiver to identify the point with certainty, then this is hard 
information. If the information provides only a confidence interval or a space around the 
point, that is, a larger area X+C; Y+D where C and D are positive, then this is soft (i.e. 
noisy) information. This definition combines definitions such as Petersen (2002) and 
others, which describe hard information as numerical, and fits the banking context of soft 
information. For example, after an interview a credit officer can say: “this person 
presents good credit risk” this is soft information, since it provides only a bound around 
the exact credit evaluation of the person. On the other hand, the information may be: “he 
was delinquent three times, his mortgage is 500,000 which combines to a credit score of 
4.2”. Notice, that even in the latter case we still do not know whether or not the person 
will pay the loan, however, the information is hard
4. 
                                                 
4 Is this view of soft information isomorphic to other definitions (such as Laffont and Tirole (1997) and 
others) which differentiate between the two types of information by the cost of transmission? In some   4
  Thus far, the main institutional settings in which soft information has been 
discussed are in the financial industry, where soft information is typically one element in 
a decision-making process. However, in this industry there are quite a few objective, 
numerical measures that can be evaluated in a standard framework by agents in the 
organization. Our empirical setting for this paper is an industry where soft information is 
considerably more important. The broadest conceptualization of the film industry is that 
it is a mechanism for turning ideas into profit.  Regardless of one’s personal views on the 
aesthetic quality of Hollywood productions, it is undeniable that a major portion of the 
industry is devoted to the solicitation, evaluation, screening and business assessment of 
artistic projects.  Many of these projects begin as script concepts that are read by agents, 
pitched to studio professionals, reviewed within studio companies, discussed and 
approved or rejected at meetings, optioned or purchased by studios through simple or 
contingent contracts, revised and re-written as part of the production process and finally 
reviewed by industry participants for awards. This trajectory is common to many artistic 
endeavors. However, unlike non-commercial aesthetic creations, such as art produced by 
not-for-profit enterprises, products of the film industry are subject to the judgment of the 
marketplace. Thus, the aesthetic characteristics of the project – in our case, the quality of 
the script – can matter a lot, economically. A film can have all the elements of a past box 
office hit – talented cast, the requisite number of chase scenes and love scenes and great 
special effects and still be a flop if the script is not good. Much of the evaluation of 
quality is based upon the economic processing of soft information.  This makes the film 
industry an excellent laboratory for the study of the role of soft information.
 Whereas 
previous research has relied upon indirect or residual measures of soft information effects 
(cf. Berger, Miller, Rajan and Stein, 2002) with movie industry data we can directly study 
intellectual property sales, where soft information is an integral part of the transaction. In 
particular, we will gauge the complexity and depth of information available about a 
project and relate this to its price.  
  We adopt complexity as a convenient measure of soft information, because simple 
information is presumably easier to quantify. Recall that our definition suggests that 
                                                                                                                                                 
sense, the answer to this question is yes. That is, you can investigate more and more and make soft 
information increasingly harder.   5
assets whose value depends on soft information will tend to be evaluated differently by 
different people. In the case of screenplay sales, since many people are involved in the 
decision, soft information can cause a divergence of views and make sale at an agreed-
upon price more difficult. A script with a short, simple description like “A buddy story 
set in the Wild West” is low on soft information content, and thus more easily evaluated 
and agreed upon by industry participants. Our other measure directly assesses the 
information content available to the purchaser of screenplays. 
 
Predictions 
  The hypotheses we test are rather straightforward. The first, most general 
hypothesis is that soft information as well as hard information is priced in sales of 
intellectual property – in other words, we can quantify the impact of soft information on 
prices paid. The second hypothesis is that a high ratio of soft to hard information will 
lower prices. Since one measure of hard information about screenplays is the reputation 
of the writer, we will also test a third hypothesis, which is much more obvious; that 
(measurable) reputation is priced in intellectual property sales. 
In the second part of the paper, we will test how this pricing function ultimately 
affects valuation of the finished product, in this case revenues and rates of return. 
   
I II II I. .   D DA AT TA A, ,   B BA AC CK KG GR RO OU UN ND D   A AN ND D   V VA AR RI IA AB BL LE ES S   
  The process of turning an idea into a completed movie is complex and long. Not 
only is it difficult to get a screenplay produced, but it is difficult to even get an idea 
reviewed. One can register a screenplay with the Writers Guild of America (WGA), 
however, a writer will need an agent in order to submit a screenplay to a studio or 
production company. Getting an agent may not be trivial either – quite a few agencies do 
not accept unsolicited manuscripts (see WGA.org), and represent only people who are 
referred by people they know. Once a writer has representation, an agent may submit a 
screenplay to be evaluated by a production company. Most major studios have several 
layers of screening before a script ends up actually in the hands of someone who can 
make a purchase decision. This latter decision can come in several ways. A screenplay 
may be optioned. That is, a studio may pay an agreed-upon amount, typically 10% of the   6
total estimated sale value and in return it will have some time, typically 18 months, to 
study the screenplay. During the option period, the screenwriter is not allowed to sell the 
script to anybody else. This “option” period can be extended. At the end of the period, the 
script may or may not be purchased. WGA sets minimum prices for screenplays (which 
are currently around $50,000 for a low budget movie and up to $90,000 for a high budget 
film). Most purchases in our data set are at much higher prices. However, a purchase 
(which is when the screenplay appears in our data), even at a very high price, is no 
guarantee of production. It may still take a while for anything to happen -- first, 
screenplays are “developed,” that is, changed, re-written and adapted to both the creative 
and pragmatic (budget) requirements of the purchasing entity.
5 Then, even if everybody 
is happy with the final write-up there may not be a studio that is willing to finance and 
distribute the film.
6 
  Fundamental to the entire process is the “pitch.” That is, the basic concept of the 
screenplay boiled down to a parsimonious narrative that can be delivered in a paragraph 
or two or verbally by a writer, agent or another intermediary in the process. The pitch 
must have all of the necessary elements to explain the potential appeal of the story, 
without the complexities and detail of the actual script. A script with a simple pitch is 
characterized as a “high concept” script. The common belief in Hollywood is that a high 
concept script is more valuable, and easier to sell to readers and producers.
7  
  We gather data on the screenplay “pitch” or “logline,” (the description used to sell 
the script) as well as screenwriter compensation, screenwriter reputation, script 
complexity, and movie financials and characteristics from various sources. Our main 
source of information is the 2003 Spec Screenplay Sales Directory, compiled by 
Hollywoodsales.com. It contains approximately six years of screenplays sales. The 
information provided on each sale includes: title, pitch, genre, agent, producer, date-of-
                                                 
5 A playwright contractually controls a play written for the theater- no one is not allowed to change her 
lines. In the movie business this is very different. Don Jacoby, who received 1.5 million dollars for his 
script told Variety in November 1998 "Not eight words from the original script were in the movie". 
6 The film industry boasts a large number of people who make a very nice living writing screenplays but 
rarely if ever seeing anything actually produced. 
7  Cf.  Orr, Bonnie, “High Concept,”  Screentalk.biz, http://www.screentalk.biz/art043.htm.  See also: 
Lerch, Jennifer, 1999, 500 Ways to Beat the Hollywood Script Reader : Writing the Screenplay the Reader 
Will Recommend,  Fireside Press.  Also.   Downs,  William Missouri and  Robin U. Russin, 2003,   
Screenplay: Writing the Picture, Silman-James Press.   7
sale, purchase price, and buyer. Sometime additional information regarding the particular 
screenplay is provided. This information is generally positive, but it may be more 
“neutral” in nature, for example, that a production deal is sought. There are 1,269 scripts 
in our sample.    
  We have a purchase price for 788 scripts (62.09% of the total sample). The 
purchase price may be an exact number (which we have for 224 scripts, 28.42% of scripts 
with available purchase price, 17.65% of the total sample). In other cases, Spec 
Screenplay Sales Directory may record an approximate price (554 scripts). This is 
generally recorded as, for example, mid- 600’s, or low 400’s. In the latter case, we 
transform the price range into a best estimate (for instance, low five figures is 
transformed into $25,000; high six figures is transformed into $750,000). Using these 
numbers and transformations, we analyze the data further.  
Screenwriters may be offered two types of contracts. The first is a fixed payment, 
non-contingent contract. There are 299 (38%) such screenplays in our sample. 
Alternatively, the screenwriter may be offered a contingent contract -- 489 of the scripts 
in our sample fit this description. In a contingent contract the screenwriter receives an 
initial payment upon contract signing and an additional amount if the script is produced. 
Average compensation in non-contingent contracts is (in thousands) $1,204.19 (standard 
deviation, 4,314.66). In contingent contracts, the average initial payment is much lower, 
$405.06 (standard deviation, 411.28); total compensation if the script is finally produced 
is $882.38 (standard deviation, 900.22).  
  A screenplay, as we explained earlier, needs to pass several layers of approval. 
The logline is the first step in that process, and is widely regarded as a vital part of 
getting the project accepted by an agent and then a studio.
 8 In order to assess the soft 
information in the logline, we start with a simple measure, namely, the number of words. 
The theory is straightforward. – if a concept is complicated, then more words are required 
to describe it
9. 
                                                 
8  For example, see web advice on crafting the logline. http://www.inktip.com/tips-loglines.php . 
9 In recent years the theory and practice of automated evaluation of texts has been progressing rapidly.  Yet, 
as we discussed, it would be difficult to quantify a measure for soft information. At this stage of progress it 
is not clear that a machine can indeed perform a sufficiently transparent analysis. Therefore, we preferred 
the simplest measure, namely, the number of words. Chevalier and Mayzlin (2003) consider the number of 
characters in reviews posted for books sold on Amazon.com and BN.com as a value measure. Their   8
  Out of 1,269 scripts, the Directory reports logline  for 1,218 scripts (95.98%). The 
average logline description contains 25.92 words (standard deviation is 13.65). Since the 
number of words is a rough approximation, and different types of descriptions require 
more or less words for the same level of complexity, we created a coarse division to 
approximate the fundamental differences in complexity. Our variable soft_words equals 0 
if the logline contains less than 20 words; 1 if the logline contains between 21 and 30 
words; 2 if the logline contains between 31 and 40 words; and 3 if the logline contains 
more than 40 words.  The logline may be just descriptive or may contain references to 
existing movies. Eighty-five scripts (6.97% of the scripts for which we have the 
storyline) mention at least one movie in the story line (56 mention 1 movie, 29 mention 2 
movies). We assume that analogy or reference to other movies makes the logline more 
transparent. Additional information is provided for 573 scripts, (45.15% of the sample). 
This information obviously makes the script easier to interpret. We create a dummy 
variable for the availability of additional information.  
  The discussion of soft information in the previous section should make it clear 
that it is very difficult to measure soft information precisely. Thus, even if we have the 
correct characterization, most of the action should probably be in the extreme cases. We 
create a very simple script complexity index, Transparent Script, that equals 1 when the 
log line contains less than 20 words (i.e. Soft_Words equals 0), and additional 
information about the script is available (i.e. InfoDummy equals 1 ). Transparent Script is 
equal to 1 for 217 scripts (17.1% of the sample). 
  Genres are commonly considered to be important variables in studies of films (for 
a recent example see DeVany, 2004). Four hundred and sixty five scripts (36.64% of the 
sample) are assigned more than one genre (453 are assigned two genres, 11 three genres 
and 1 four genres). We group the different genres reported by Spec Screenplay Sales 
Directory into six broad categories: action (189 scripts), comedy (571 scripts), drama 
(257 scripts), romance (257 scripts), thriller (224 scripts), and other (123 scripts). Genres 
can be control variables (i.e. compensation may be higher for certain genres than for 
                                                                                                                                                 
findings suggest that longer reviews are required to support a “mixed” review, i.e.  1 star (worst) and 5 star 
(best) reviews are associated with shorter reviews. This is consistent with our view of length as a measure 
of complexity and nuances.  Godes and Mayzlin (2003) find that more complicated measures are very 
noisy. For a discussion and implementation of some of the automated methodologies see for example 
Tetlock (2003).    9
others), but can also serve as a measure of complexity, namely, if more than one genre is 
assigned to a screenplay that may indicate more complexity and a higher component of 
soft information. 
  The next set of variables describes our “hard information” set, namely, the 
screenwriter’s reputation and past success. Many papers show that reputation matters. 
John, Ravid and Sunder (2004) show that the re-hiring decision of film directors depends 
on their past success. To measure screenwriter reputation, we search the Internet Movie 
Database (IMDb) for the number of scripts previously sold by the screenwriter and 
produced. If we find no entries, we also search our own data-base to see if any screenplay 
had been previously sold by this writer. The average number of previously produced 
scripts is 2.0236 per screenwriter (standard deviation, 5.5593). The writers of 730 scripts 
(57.52% of the sample) have not sold any previous work. Reputation Movies takes the 
value 0 if the screenwriter has never had any screenplay produced (as per IMDB); 1 if the 
screenwriter has had between 1 and 3 scripts produced (which is the case for 348 scripts, 
27.42% of the sample); 2 if between 4 and 10 scripts have been produced (142 scripts, 
11.18% of the sample); and 3 if the screenwriter has previously had more than 10 scripts 
produced(49 scripts, 3.86% of the sample). If we cannot find any produced screenplay in 
IMDB and no previous sale in our data base, then our experienced writer variable 
receives a value of zero. We use additional reputation variables. Nominated Oscar 
(Awarded Oscar) takes the value 1 if the screenwriter had been previously nominated to 
(had won) an Oscar. Any Nomination (Any Award) takes the value 1 if the screenwriter 
had been previously nominated to (had won) an award in any of the major festivals 
tracked by IMDb: Oscars, Golden Globes, British Academy Awards, Emmy Award, 
European Film Award, Cannes, Sundance, Toronto and Berlin. For 71 scripts, the 
screenwriter had been nominated in a major festival; in 32 cases, the screenwriter has 
previously won an award in a major festival; in 27 cases, s/he had been nominated to an 
Oscar; and for 10 scripts, the screenwriter had previously won an Oscar. Finally, an 
unknown screenwriter may use a manager to compensate for his lack of reputation. Spec 
Screenplay Sales Directory reports that the screenwriters who wrote 172 of the scripts 
sold (13.55% of the total sample) employ a manager.    10
The Internet Movie Database (IMDb) reports all films produced or that are in 
production. 311 scripts (24.51% of the total sample) have been produced or are in 
production as of December 2003. It is virtually certain that more screenplays will be 
produced in the future, especially from the most recent acquisitions
10. Thus, although we 
do run a regression for the probability of being produced, we do not consider the results 
an important part of our analysis. On the other hand, we can certainly evaluate the 
projects produced and compare them to the screenplays that generated them. 
  For each movie produced, we obtain its financial performance from Baseline 
services in California. Specifically, we have the budget of each film, domestic revenues, 
international revenues as well as video and DVD revenues. We use two measures of 
return. One is total revenues over budget, and the other is total revenues over budget plus 
advertising and promotion expenditures
11. For each film we obtain several additional 
control variables. MPAA ratings (in particular, family friendly ratings) have been shown 
to be a most important determinant of revenues and returns in a number of previous 
papers
12 . We obtain ratings for all films released. Interestingly, our sample of films 
produced tends to be somewhat skewed – there are no G rated films, and more PG-13 
than expected (see MPAA.org or Ravid (1999) for a discussion of the distribution of 
ratings). It seems that G- rated films and in general family films, which also tend to be 
the most successful (see Ravid (1999), Simonoff and Sparrow (2000), De Vany and 
Walls (2002) or Fee (2002)) are developed “in house” rather than as a result of purchases 
of outside screenplays.  
We use several additional control variables. Star power can, in principle, 
significantly impact box office revenues
13. To assess star qualities, we use IMDB, which 
provides a list of the director, and up to 8 main cast members. We then classify each cast 
                                                 
10 “If you aspire to be a screenwriter, you should look at your work as a process that will come to fruition 
over time- perhaps a long time” writes Peter Miller (1998) in a book (p.90) for newcomers to the business. 
11 In spite of industry wisdom, promotional expenditures are highly correlated with the budget (see Ravid 
and Basuroy, 2004). Therefore the two indices are highly correlated. Although we do have rental numbers 
i.e. what the studio collects of the revenues, we do not have comparable numbers  for home entertainment, 
where contracts are more complicated. Thus, for consistency, we use total revenues as a measure of 
income. Rentals are roughly half the revenues for theatrical exhibition, but not so for home entertainment 
revenues.  
12 See for example, Ravid (1999), Ravid and Basuroy (2004) Fee (2002), DeVany and Walls (2002) or 
Simonoff and Sparrow (2000). 
13 In Ravid (1999), however, star power did not end up being a significant determinant of either revenues or 
return on investment.   11
member following a similar procedure to the one used to measure screenwriter 
reputation. The variable Cast Nominated Oscar counts, for each film, the total number of 
Oscar nominations for the film’s 8 main cast members, previous to the film’s production 
date. Cast Awarded Oscar, Cast Any Nomination and Cast Any Award have a similar 
interpretation.  
Alternatively, we use IMDB Starmeter to classify an actor as a star. STARmeter 
uses proprietary algorithms that take into account several measures of popularity for 
people and titles. The primary measure captures who or what is being viewed on the 
public IMDb.com website. Other factors include box office receipts and user quality 
votes on a scale of 1-10. The rankings are updated on a weekly basis. We classify an 
actor as a star if he or she has a Starmeter ranking higher than 150 in the first entry in 
January of the year the movie is released. For example, Edward Norton was the lead 
character in the film The 25
th Hour, released on December 19, 2002. Norton’s ranking on 
January 6, 2002 was 99, so that according to the Starmeter classification, he would be 
classified as a star
14.Our Starmeter variable counts for each film (similar to other cast 
reputation variables)the total number of cast members who were classified as stars in 
January of the year the movie was released. Using the different reputation variables, we 
create dummies as alternative measures of cast stardom. Thus, Cast Dummy Awarded 
Oscar, for instance, takes the value one if any cast member has been previously awarded 
an Oscar
15.  
  We use several additional variables. The publication Variety lists reviews for the 
first weekend in which a film opens in New York. Although reviews are provided for 
other cities, the “New York” reviews are usually the first to appear, contain the largest 
number of reviews, and include national listings as well (such as broadcast network 
reviews or national magazines). Thus we use the New York reviews in our analysis. The 
total number of reviews, Total Reviews proxies for the attention the movie receives
16. In 
                                                 
14 We experimented with star meter rankings of the highest 50 or highest 100, but that did not change the 
qualitative results. None of these variables was significant. 
15 Following with our example, Cast Dummy Awarded Oscar takes the value one for the film The 25
th 
Hour, since one of the film’s cast members, Anna Paquin, received an Academy Award in 1994 for his role 
in the film The Piano.  
16 Ravid (1999) found that the total reviews variable significantly affected movie performance in his 
sample.   12
its Crix pix column, Variety classifies reviews as “pro”, “con”, and “mixed.” We use 
these classifications to come up with measures of the quality of critical reviews: Positive 
Reviews is the ratio of number of “pro” reviews divided by the number of total reviews. 
Non-Negative Reviews is the ratio of non-negative reviews (i.e., good plus mixed) 
divided by the number of total reviews
17. 
  Finally, we looked up each film’s release date. In some other studies (Litman 
1983; Chisholm 2000), release dates were used as dummy variables, on the theory that a 
Christmas release should attract greater audiences, and on the other hand, a release in a 
low attendance period should be bad for revenues. However, since there are several peaks 
and troughs in attendance throughout the year, we use information from Einav (2003), 
which provides a ranking for each week of the year
18. 
 
I IV V. .   R RE ES SU UL LT TS S   
1. Hard information, Soft Information and Screenplay Pricing. 
  Table I suggests that two elements are salient in the screenplay price – 
screenwriter reputation and soft information. We see that the number of movies 
previously credited to the screenwriter dramatically increases the compensation. 
Reputation and experience matter -- if it is a writer’s first movie, he or she receives 
significantly less money. Similarly, writers who have written more screenplays 
(reputation movies = 3) are significantly less likely to receive a contingent contract, 
which has a risk-sharing element. Nomination of any kind increases the writer’s 
compensation significantly. Surprisingly, it seems that receiving an Oscar is less valuable 
that being nominated, however, we should recall that we only have very few academy 
award winners in the sample. Thus, panel B suggests that the “hard information” 
component is important for pricing.  
The next panel includes “soft information” variables. The results suggest that 
shorter (“high concept”) loglines (soft-words=0) are associated with much higher 
                                                 
17 In Ravid (1999) only the total number of reviews mattered.  However, Eliashberg and Shugan (1997) as 
well as Basuroy et al. (2003) found that reviews significantly affect the weekly revenues. 
18 Another variable that may be of interest is whether or not a film is a sequel.  While sequels tend to be 
more expensive and bring in lower revenues than the original film, they may still outperform the average 
film if they can capitalize on a successful formula. Ravid (1999) supports this view.  However, for obvious 
reasons we do not have sequels in our sample.  
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payments, and a lower probability of a contingency pay. Similarly, screenplays that 
provide additional information are rewarded for it, and a “transparent script”, which is a 
composite of the two measures, is worth almost three times as much as a “non-
transparent” one. Genres may play a role, but the role is unclear from the tabulation 
above. (Unreported) medians of   our variables tell the same story. 
Regressions test the hypothesis of a relationship between soft information, 
compensation and deal structure.
19 Table II reports a regression in which the dependent 
variable is the price paid in either contingent or non-contingent contracts. For contingent 
contracts, the dependent variable is the price paid if the movie is not made, that is, 
upfront. In the case of non-contingent contracts, we use the price actually paid. The 
results seem to confirm the findings in the means tests. 
In all regression specifications, the genres and even the manager variable add 
virtually nothing to explanatory power. The only significant variables are reputation 
variables, such as the number of films the screenwriter had written, or nominations for 
major awards, (which are our “hard information” variables), as well as several soft 
information variables, in particular, when they interact with low reputation. Specifically, 
we find that the longer the log-line the lower the price, and the more information is 
available the higher is the price paid. The significance level increases for “low 
reputation” (first time) screenwriters. However, the most significant variable is   
“transparent script”, which describes screenplays with additional information and for 
which the log line contains less than 20 words. The lower is the “soft information” 
content, as measured by “transparent script,” the higher is the price. This makes sense. If 
a screenwriter has a sterling reputation, a studio may be willing to buy a much softer 
product from him or her. However, if he or she is untested, they had better have a very 
clear “high concept” script at hand.
20 As a rough estimate, we can say that having sold a 
previous movie increases the price received by roughly a half a million dollars. However, 
a transparent screenplay is worth over $1 million more. 
                                                 
19 All regressions are tested for multicolinearity and the standard errors are White heteroskedasticity 
adjusted standard errors. 
20 This result is conceptually similar to the finding in the banking literature that small, opaque firms have 
more difficulties in obtaining credit, and prefer working with smaller banks which can better handle soft 
information (see Petersen (2002) and Berger et al. (2003).   14
Table III presents similar tests for the subset of non-contingent contracts in which 
a firm price is established. The results are qualitatively similar, but the explanatory power 
is higher. The R
2 increases in the first and last columns to about 38% from 27%. As 
before, soft information variables, and in particular “transparent script,” are significant 
and so are reputation variables. For low reputation screenwriters even the genre-related 
soft information approximation (characterizing a screenplay that had to be classified by 
several genres) significantly reduces the price paid. Again, soft information matters more 
for the less well-known writers.
21 
This latter soft information variable is also significant in table IV, which measures 
the initial compensation in contingent contracts. All previously significant variables are 
significant here as well. Interestingly, the genre of the film does not matter – in other 
words, it seems that studios are eclectic in what they are willing to buy. Here, however, 
the “manager” variable has a negative value – having a manager is associated with a 
lower price up front. 
Table V presents a probit regression estimating the likelihood of receiving a 
contingent contract. In principle, such contracts should not be offered to risk-averse 
screenwriters. A risk neutral corporate entity should be willing to take the risk and pocket 
the risk premium while offering a risk-averse writer a lower compensation. However, as 
argued in Ravid and Basuroy (2004), it seems studio executives are more risk averse than 
they should be, and thus, as risk increases, they may want the writer to share it.  
High concept screenplays by well-established writers should be the least risky, 
and thus should not require contingent contracts to address uncertainty. This comes 
through clearly in our test. Writers are less likely to receive a contingent contract if they 
have sold more screenplays. There is an interesting contrast between this result and the 
findings of Chisholm (1997). Chisholm discusses the probability that actors receive a 
share contract (as opposed to fixed compensation). She finds that more experienced 
actors are, if anything, more likely to receive share contracts. Chisholm’s findings 
support the Gibbons and Murphy (1992) and Holmstrom and Milgrom (1992) 
interpretation of the life cycle of contracts. Experienced actors may need more incentives 
since their reputation will not be tarnished by one less successful movie, or they may be 
                                                 
21 Action films command a lower price as well. We are not sure why this is the case.   15
closer to retirement. However, in the case of screenwriters, a contingent contract only 
reflects uncertainty as to the prospects of the product, which are diminished with 
experience.  
All complexity variables, including the two variables reflecting the number of 
words in the log line, and including the number of genres, seem to increase the 
probability of receiving a contingent contract, and similarly, if information is available 
the contract is less likely to be contingent. In other words, soft information of any kind 
seems to present a risk factor which the studios would like to share with the writer. If the 
writer can provide “hard information” assurances that the risk is lower, studios are 
willing to pay more upfront. 
In Table VI, we report a probit regression estimating the probability of a 
screenplay being produced. Since it sometimes takes several years or more in 
development for a screenplay to become a movie, and since our last screenplay was sold 
in 2002, we have a right-truncation of the data. The specification suggests that 
screenplays by reputable writers seem to have an edge and similarly, low reputation and 
soft information seemed to delay production. In other words, the lower price paid for low 
reputation high soft information screenplays may be justified and there appears to be a 
lower probability of such screenplays making it to the big screen. 
Our analysis thus far indicates that both hard information and soft information are 
priced in screenplays sales. Soft information in general lowers the price whereas 
(positive) hard information increases it significantly. Further, there seems to be an 
interaction between the two types of factors- low reputation further depresses the value of 
soft- information- rich screenplays. We turn next to examine the role of soft information 
in the success or failure of movies that are actually produced, and in the process, we are 
able to consider whether the first stage (screenplays) pricing makes sense. 
 
2. Hard information, soft information and the success of films 
 Table VII describes a sample of 151 films produced from the screenplay sample. 
The distribution of movie releases from our sample is somewhat skewed compared to a 
random sample – there are no G rated movies, fewer PG -rated movies, fewer R- rated 
movies and more PG-13 rated movies than in a random sample, (see Ravid, 1999, and   16
MPAA.org). It seems that the most profitable family movies tend to be developed in 
house, rather than purchased from outside screenwriters. However, the pattern of 
profitability in the films produced is similar to that of most other studies, (c.f. Ravid, 
1999, DeVany and Walls, 2002 Fee, 2001, and Simonoff and Sparrow, 2000). PG rating, 
the most family friendly rating is also the most profitable.  
Table VIII compares the screenplays of first time writers vs. experienced writers. 
Films based on scripts by first time screenwriters have lower budgets, as expected. 
However, their rate of return is higher. These differences in performance, however, are 
not statistically significant. Interestingly, the reviews for films based upon “better” 
screenwriters’ work are worse than average and worse than for first time screenwriters. A 
similar pattern emerges when we classify screenwriters according to any nomination, 
however, here films by more reputable writers receive somewhat better reviews. We also 
note that, as expected, whereas 57% of the screenplays in our sample were produced by 
first-time screenwriters, only 46% of the sample of films produced are based on 
screenplays by first time writers. 
We sought to explain the components of revenue (domestic, international, video 
and DVD as well as total revenues and rate of return) by control variables as well as the 
price paid for the screenplay.
22 We only report domestic (Table IX) and total revenues, 
which include revenues from all sources (Table X). The control variables that are 
significant are similar to those that mattered in other work – namely, family friendly [PG] 
rating, a seasonal variable and the budget. The star status of the cast does not make a 
difference (see Ravid, 1999, for similar results on a different sample, as well as DeVany, 
2004). However the price paid for the screenplay is positive and significant in all 
regressions. Consistent with the idea that the industry is able to effectively process soft 
information and make rational economic decisions, it seems that if a studio pays more for 
a screenplay, the movie makes more money. Results are similar for other revenue 
components (not reported). However, other elements in the decision process of buying a 
                                                 
22 See Ravid (1999) and Ravid and Basuroy (2004) for a discussion of the methodology.   17
screenplay, which depend on actually making the films, were not significant in any of the 
regressions.
23 
Perhaps more interesting is the rate of return regression (Table XI). The control 
variables that matter are PG rating and seasonality, which mattered in other work (see 
Ravid, 1999, and Einav, 2003). However, the rate of return increases significantly with 
the price paid as well. This means that more expensive screenplays not only increase 
revenues, but actually increase profitability. 
Finally, Table XII suggests another way of looking at the correlation between 
prices paid for a screenplay and the success of the resulting movie. Here we regress the 
price paid for the screenplay on soft and hard information variables as well as on a 
financial success variable for the resulting movie. We see that the price paid to the 
screenwriter essentially forecasts the success of the film, and that, even when this is taken 
into account, soft information significantly lowers the price paid to screenwriters. 
Reputation variables significantly increase the price. The results suggest that the market 
for screenplays is an efficient one. Screenwriters and their agents understand the 
economic potential of a script and set the price accordingly. However reliance on soft 
information as a signal of this potential appears to be a risk factor, the cost of which is 
borne by the writer.  
 
V V. .   C CO ON NC CL LU US SI IO ON NS S   
  Aesthetic evaluation is central to the film industry. However, despite the message 
of the annual Academy Awards ceremony, the industry does not make art for art’s sake – 
it processes complex inputs from many different fields of art with the ultimate goal of 
making a profit. This makes it an interesting setting for the analysis of the role and nature 
of soft information processing in an industrial setting. Our analysis of the trajectory of 
film scripts and the movies they eventually become suggests that “high concept” (low on 
soft information) scripts command a higher compensation. Further, films based upon 
such screenplays are also more successful. This may not be a shock to industry 
                                                 
23 This may be related to the fact that we do not have the complete set of produced films since some 
screenplay have a long gestation period. On the other hand, it may be that the value of the screenplay is 
easier to estimate than the probability of actually getting it produced.   18
participants, but it is interesting to economists who study the role of soft information in 
organizations. 
  Our major findings highlight the dual role of soft and hard information in the 
pricing of intellectual property. Reputation, which can be easily expressed in measurable 
terms, is very important, and increases the prices paid. However, a high ratio of soft to 
hard information depresses prices. That is, screenplays characterized in “softer” terms -- 
particularly if they are written by lesser known writers -- command substantially lower 
prices. Various manifestations of soft information seem also to increase the probability of 
a contingent contract, again, suggesting that soft information is viewed as a risk factor. 
Interestingly, the type of screenplay (drama, comedy, action) does not seem to affect the 
price paid. These results are consistent conceptually with findings in the banking 
industry. 
  In the second part of the paper we link the economic performance of the film with 
screenplay characteristics. We find that the industry can reasonably forecast how the 
resulting movie will perform. All else equal, studios pay more for screenplays that lead to 
movies with higher revenues and also higher rates of return. This finding certainly 
contradicts the view that production decisions are arbitrary and ill-informed. From an 
economic perspective, it suggests that pricing is efficient, even in an industry with a 
complex production function relying fundamentally on soft information. In addition, not 
only is the economic value of inputs to the production process well determined, but the 
quality and type of signals about the inputs are priced as well.  
  In recent years, quantification and statistical analysis have become increasingly 
important tools in business. Objective measures of inputs are manifestly important – 
indeed our study verifies the value of objective recognition of past success. However, as 
quantification and measurement continue to rationalize business practice, the limits to 
these tools have become abundantly clear. Banks may never be able to eliminate loan 
officers. The soft information they provide -- the cognitive processing – is still 
irreplaceable. Similarly, electronic script-reading automatons might be able to screen 
thousands of screenplays rather than relying upon agents and readers to filter them. 
However such complete mechanization is unlikely. Thus, in the interim we find ourselves   19
in a situation in which the ambiguity of human judgment is seen as a necessary cost of 
business.    20
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Price Cont Produced
Scripts with Compensation Information 788 778.36 0.6206 22.1
Scripts with Contingent Contracts 299 23.02
Scripts with Non-Contingent Contracts 489 19.09
Panel B: Screenwriter Reputation
Price Cont Produced
Reputation Movies 0 479 0.6290 0.1840
1 765 0.6091 0.2786
2 1,633 0.6667 0.2464
3 4,761 0.3810 0.3261
Experienced Writer 0 479 0.6290 0.1840
1 1,205 0.6081 0.2743
Nominated Oscar 0 702 0.6232 0.2172
1 5,090 0.4615 0.4615
Awarded Oscar 0 770 0.6229 0.2199
1 2,736 0.0000 0.5556
Any Nomination 0 620 0.6238 0.2104
1 3,572 0.5609 0.3585
Any Award 0 765 0.6237 0.2169
1 1,573 0.4166 0.4231
Panel C: Soft Information
Price Cont Produced
Soft_Words 0 1,050 0.6047 0.2016
1 639 0.6065 0.2447
2 496 0.6383 0.2227
3 660 0.7157 0.2548
InfoDummy 0 638 0.6323 0.2058
1 1,034 0.5985 0.2431
Tansparent Script 0 627 0.6210 0.2208
1 1,735 0.6176 0.2297
Panel D: Genres
Price Cont Produced
Action 125 685 0.6617 0.2097
Comedy 344 752 0.6169 0.2157
Drama 109 613 0.6471 0.2621
Romance 105 1,046 0.7000 0.2241
Thriller 155 1,102 0.5342 0.1843
Other 67 587 0.6842 0.2773
Table I: Summary Statistics.
This table summarizes the relationship between screenwriter compensation, screenwriter reputation and script complexity. The last two columns analyze
how screenwriter reputation and script complexity influence the type of contract offered to the screenwriter, as well as the probability that the script is
ultimately produced. Price measures the compensation paid to the screenwriter. Cont is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 when the screenwriter
is offered a contingent contract (i.e. a contract in which compensation depends on whether the movie is ultimated produced or not). Produced is a
dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the movie is produced and 0, otherwise. We include several screenwriter reputation variables. Reputation
Movies takes the value 0 if the screenwriter has not previously sold any script; 1 if the screenwriter has previously sold between 1 and 3 scripts; 2 if the
screenwriter has previously sold between 4 and 10 scripts; and 3 if the screenwriter has previously sold more than 10 scripts. Experienced Writer takes
the value zero if the screenwriter has not previously sold any script, and 1 otherwise. Nominated Oscar (Awarded Oscar) takes the value 1 if the
screenwriter has been previously nominated to (won) an Oscar. Any Nomination (Any Award) takes the value 1 if the screenwriter has been previously
nominated (won) to an award in the following festivals: Oscars, Golden Globes, British Academy Awards, Emmy Award, European Film Award, Cannes,
Sundance, Toronto, Berlin. We also include several variables that try to capture soft information or script complexity. Soft_Words equals 0 if the script
logline contains less than 20 words; 1 if the script logline contains between 21 and 30 words; 2 if the script logline contains between 31 and 40 words;
and 3 if the script logline contains more than 40 words. InfoDummy equals 1 if additional information about the script is available. We create a script
complexity index, Tansparent Script, that equals 1 when the log line contains less than 20 words (i.e. Soft_Words equals 0), and additional information
about the script is available (i.e. InfoDummy equals 1 ). The genres variables are dummy variables. Action (Comedy, Drama, Romance, Thriller) takes
the value 1 if the script is classified in the “Action” (Comedy, Drama, Romance, Thriller) category by Spec Screenplay Directory, and 0 otherwise.
Compensation, soft information and type of contract data are from the Spec Screenplay Sales Directory. Reputation variables and information regarding
whether the movies has been produced is from IMDB. 
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Scr Number Movies 448.618*** 448.561*** 565.927*** 502.679***
(12.4569) (12.4635) (14.3588) (13.7585)
Scr Reputation Movies 713.975*** 795.673*** 713.663***
(4.5817) (5.0832) (4.5747)
Scr Nominated Oscar 3,677.747*** 3,819.013*** 4,433.434***
(3.4757) (3.6010) (4.3892)
Scr Any Nomination 1,505.073*** 2,919.137*** 1,011.407***
(3.3005) (5.8651) (3.5164)
Transparent Script 1,013.103*** 1,217.529*** 1,010.025*** 1,230.291***
(3.5277) (3.8139) (3.6625) (3.8450)
Low Rep * Transparent Script 795.281**
(2.2702)
Words Log  -8.471
(1.0627)




Low Rep * Info Dummy 578.270**
(2.2613)
Action -356.222 -289.984 -391.526 -386.396
(1.0775) (0.7874) (1.2292) (1.1514)
Comedy 84.535 179.582 142.065 109.362
(0.2342) (0.4469) (0.4085) (0.2986)
Drama -348.264 -222.686 -283.122 -315.132
(0.8812) (0.5062) (0.7437) (0.7866)
Romance 281.973 501.239 312.522 260.353
(0.9322) (1.4871) (1.0657) (0.8474)
Thriller 426.906 469.53 434.126 416.746
(1.0791) (1.0640) (1.1370) (1.0376)
Other -518.095 -312.182 -446.081 -533.463
(1.0430) (0.5633) (0.9305) (1.0580)
Manager -298.581 -413.324 -220.137 -376.226
(0.9883) (1.2284) (0.7556) (1.1952)
Constant -73.117 176.095 375.104*** 558.741** -48.386 79.35 776.775*** -624.663 -34.928
(0.6127) (1.2279) (2.5873) (2.2337) (0.1278) (0.1861) (5.0133) (1.5283) (0.0903)
Observations 747 747 747 747 747 747 747 747 747
Adjusted R-squared 0.2856 0.1159 0.0967 0.079 0.2915 0.121 0.0767 0.2874 0.2697
Table II: General Compensation.
This table reports OLS estimates of general compensation regresions on a set of variables that measure screenwriter reputation, script complexity, movie genre and agency
relationships. The dependent variable, Price, reflects the payment made to the screenwriter when he sells the script. In non-contingentcontracts, the screenwriter compensation
is fixed (i.e. the screenwriter compensation does not depend on whether the movie is produced or not). In contingent contracts, Price reflects the screenwriter compensation
when the movie is not. We include several screenwriter reputation variables. Number Movies measures the number of scripts previously sold by the script’s screenwriter.
Reputation Movies takes the value 0 if the screenwriter has not previously sold any script; 1 if the screenwriter has previously sold between 1 and 3 scripts; 2 if the screenwriter
has previously sold between 4 and 10 scripts; and 3 if the screenwriter has previously sold more than 10 scripts. Nominated Oscar takes the value 1 if the screenwriter has been
previously nominated to an Oscar. Any Nomination takes the value 1 if the screenwriter has been previously nominated to an award in the following festivals: Oscars, Golden
Globes, British Academy Awards, Emmy Award, European Film Award, Cannes, Sundance,Toronto, Berlin. We also include several variables that try to capture soft information
or script complexity. Words Log counts the number of words in the script logline. InfoDummy equals 1 if additional information about the script is available. We create a script
complexity index, Tansparent Script, that equals 1 when the log line contains less than 20 words (i.e. Soft_Words equals 0), and additional information about the script is
available (i.e. InfoDummy equals 1 ). The genres and agency variables are dummy variables. Action (Comedy, Drama, Romance, Thriller) takes the value 1 if the script is
classified in the “Action” (Comedy, Drama, Romance, Thriller) category by Spec Screenplay Directory, and 0 otherwise. Manager takes the value of 1 if the screenwriter has a
manager, and 0 otherwise. We create interaction variables for soft low reputation - soft information. These variables, identified by Low Rep, take the value of the relevant soft
information variable if the screenwriter has not previously sold any script, and 0 otherwise. Compensation, soft information and type of contract data are from the Spec
Screenplay Sales Directory. Reputation variables and information regarding whether the movies has been produced is from IMDB. 
24Price - Non Contingent Contract
Scr Number Movies 690.886*** 790.389*** 840.684***
(9.3568) (11.4987) (11.9124)
Scr Reputation Movies 1,327.030***
(3.3647)
Scr Experienced Writer 1,130.701*
(1.8002)
Scr Nominated Oscar 6,389.574*** 8,379.540***
(2.7864) (3.5707)
Scr Any Nomination 2,399.208**
(2.1716)
Transparent Script 1,947.201*** 2,905.857*** 3,105.465***
(2.7722) (3.5384) (3.6290)




Low Rep * Info Dummy 1,387.298**
(2.2920)
Low Rep * Soft Genres 953.201 -797.130*
(1.4831) (1.9445)
Action -864.506 -1285.903 -507.576 -1,447.929*
(0.8674) (1.5973) (0.5021) (1.7908)
Comedy 104.404 1118.078 941.209 1153.325
(0.0899) (1.1913) (0.7986) (1.2309)
Drama -498.514 -4.965 -64.125 2.216
(0.3947) (0.0049) (0.0501) (0.0022)
Romance 2,493.916** 1295.004 2,965.384*** 1202.894
(2.3474) (1.5066) (2.6872) (1.4021)
Thriller 876.294 1561.609 1731.885 1,762.459*
(0.6994) (1.5405) (1.3648) (1.7432)
Other -1076.824 -1125.115 -240.672 -1137.348
(0.6626) (0.8573) (0.1473) (0.8679)
Manager -663.485 -1084.283 -671.861 -995.44
(0.7195) (1.3806) (0.7295) (1.2959)
Constant -220.32 -2.237 172.404 -1051.032 1,386.904*** 731.18 -1083.838
(0.7923) (0.0061) (0.1395) (1.0572) (2.7377) (0.6030) (1.0911)
Observations 282 282 282 282 282 282 282
Adjusted R-squared 0.3843 0.1337 0.0682 0.3928 -0.0046 0.0727 0.3947
Table III: Compensation in Non Contingent Contracts.
This table reports OLS estimates of compensation in non contingent contracts (i.e. contracts in which the screenwriter compensation does
not depend on whether the movie is produced or not) on a set of variables that measure screenwriter reputation, script complexity, movie
genre and agency relationships. The dependent variable, Price_Cont0, measures the payment that the screenwriter receives in a non-
contingent contract. We include several screenwriter reputation variables. Number Movies measures the number of scripts previously sold
by the script’s screenwriter. Reputation Movies takes the value 0 if the screenwriter has not previously sold any script; 1 if the screenwriter
has previously sold between 1 and 3 scripts; 2 if the screenwriter has previously sold between 4 and 10 scripts; and 3 if the screenwriter
has previously sold more than 10 scripts. Experienced Writer takes the value zero if the screenwriter has not previously sold any script,
and 1 otherwise. Nominated Oscar takes the value 1 if the screenwriter has been previously nominated to an Oscar. Any Nomination takes
the value 1 if the screenwriter has been previously nominated to an award in the following festivals: Oscars, Golden Globes, British
Academy Awards, Emmy Award, European Film Award, Cannes, Sundance, Toronto, Berlin. We also include several variables that try to
capture soft information or script complexity. Words Log counts the number of words in the script logline. InfoDummy equals 1 if additional
information about the script is available. We create a script complexity index, Tansparent Script, that equals 1 when the log line contains
less than 20 words (i.e. Soft_Words equals 0), and additional information about the script is available (i.e. InfoDummy equals 1 ).
Soft_Genre equals 1 if the qualified number of genres is greater than 2, and 0 otherwise. The genres and agency variables are dummy
variables. Action (Comedy, Drama, Romance, Thriller) takes the value 1 if the script is classified in the “Action” (Comedy, Drama,
Romance, Thriller) category by Spec Screenplay Directory, and 0 otherwise. Manager takes the value of 1 if the screenwriter has a
manager, and 0 otherwise. We create interaction variables for soft low reputation - soft information. These variables, identified by Low
Rep, take the value of the relevant soft information variable if the screenwriter has not previously sold any script, and 0 otherwise.
Compensation, soft information and type of contract data are from the Spec Screenplay Sales Directory. Reputation variables and
information regarding whether the movies has been produced is from IMDB.  t-statistics are in parenthesis.
*,**,*** indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels.
25Price - Movie Not Made Contingent Contract
Scr Number Movies 32.881*
(1.6552)
Scr Reputation Movies 176.156*** 170.986***
(5.9712) (5.8447)




Low Rep * Soft Words
Info Dummy 52.264 85.089* 10.56
(1.1988) (1.8866) (0.1925)
Low Rep * Soft Genres -69.993** -119.700*** -79.462**
(2.2228) (4.2469) (2.4024)
Low Rep * Log Movies -12.788
(0.2040)
Soft Log Movies 110.534
(1.4254)
Action 102.825 10.516 7.622
(1.4790) (0.4270) (0.3114)
Comedy -3.224 64.556 39.674
(0.0438) (0.8476) (0.5168)
Drama -90.397 -33.529 -58.686
(1.1031) (0.3946) (0.6894)
Romance -31.345 34.754 13.945
(0.5317) (0.5654) (0.2247)
Thriller -16.449 49.944 13.967
(0.1998) (0.5887) (0.1618)
Other -24.634 41.851 7.503
(0.2474) (0.4078) (0.0726)
Manager -171.697*** -159.649** -149.951**
(2.7020) (2.4671) (2.4073)
Constant 392.893*** 334.714*** 354.656*** 549.772*** 480.868*** 481.267*** 529.214***
(11.7908) (11.3939) (4.5431) (16.6460) (17.4110) (6.1087) (6.4861)
Observations 465 465 465 465 465 465 465
Adjusted R-squared 0.1722 0.2399 0.2555 0.2142 0.186 0.2218 0.2298
Table IV: Initial Compensation in Contingent Contracts.
This table reports OLS estimates of initial compensation in contingent contracts (i.e. contracts in which the screenwriter compensation
depends on whether the movie is produced or not) on a set of variables that measure screenwriter reputation, script complexity, movie
genre and agency relationships. The dependent variable, Price_Cont1 measures the initial payment that the screenwriter receives in a
contingent contract. If the movie is not produced, the screenwriter does not receive any additional compensation. When the movie is
produced, the screenwriter is paid an additional fee. We include several screenwriter reputation variables. Number Movies measures the
number of scripts previously sold by the script’s screenwriter. Reputation Movies takes the value 0 if the screenwriter has not previously
sold any script; 1 if the screenwriter has previously sold between 1 and 3 scripts; 2 if the screenwriter has previously sold between 4 and
10 scripts; and 3 if the screenwriter has previously sold more than 10 scripts. We also include several variables that try to capture soft
information or script complexity. Words Log counts the number of words in the script logline. Soft_Words equals 0 if the script logline
contains less than 20 words; 1 if the script logline contains between 21 and 30 words; 2 if the script logline contains between 31 and 40
words; and 3 if the script logline contains more than 40 words. Soft_Logmovies equals 1 if the scripts logline refers to any other movie, and
0 otherwise. InfoDummy equals 1 if additional information about the script is available. Soft_Genre equals 1 if the qualified number of
genres is greater than 2, and 0 otherwise. The genres and agency variables are dummy variables. Action (Comedy, Drama, Romance,
Thriller) takes the value 1 if the script is classified in the “Action” (Comedy, Drama, Romance, Thriller) category by Spec Screenplay
Directory, and 0 otherwise. AgeManager takes the value of 1 if the screenwriter has a manager, and 0 otherwise. We create interaction
variables for soft low reputation - soft information. These variables, identified by Low Rep, take the value of the relevant soft information
variable if the screenwriter has not previously sold any script, and 0 otherwise. Compensation, soft information and type of contract data
are from the Spec Screenplay Sales Directory. Reputation variables and information regarding whether the movies has been produced is
from IMDB.  t-statistics are in parenthesis.
*,**,*** indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels.
26Contingent Contract (Type of Contract)
Scr Number Movies -0.018* -0.020* -0.017 -0.021*
(1.7338) (1.8115) (1.5961) (1.9050)
Scr Experienced Writer -0.069 -0.063
(0.7372) (0.6617)
Transparent Script -0.009 -0.023
(0.0634) (0.1684)








Low Rep * Info Dummy -0.095
(0.8017)
Soft Genres 1.002* 1.017* 0.928* 0.973*
(1.8845) (1.8892) (1.6848) (1.8672)
Action 0.194 0.124 0.202
(1.2188) (0.7629) (1.2695)
Comedy -0.137 -0.191 -0.13
(0.7893) (1.0742) (0.7472)
Drama 0.022 -0.042 0.026
(0.1141) (0.2125) (0.1371)
Romance 0.282* 0.247* 0.289*
(1.9065) (1.6565) (1.9573)
Thriller -0.254 -0.313 -0.247
(1.3332) (1.6219) (1.2968)
Other 0.249 0.25 0.257
(1.0287) (1.0091) (1.0601)
Manager 0.061 0.116 0.085
(0.4425) (0.8266) (0.6028)
Constant 0.346*** 0.153 0.264*** 0.374** 0.417** 0.325*** 0.383**
(6.5605) (1.5129) (3.3667) (2.0603) (2.1990) (6.1873) (2.1061)
Observations 762 762 762 762 762 762 762
Table V: Type of Contract Offered to the Screenwriter.
This table reports probit estimates of the type of contract offered to the screenwriter depending on a set of variables that measure screenwriter r
script complexity, movie genre and agency relationships. The dependent variable, Cont, is a dummy variable that equals 0 if the screenwriter’s com
is fixed; that is, the screenwriter receives a certain salary regardless of whether the movie is produced or not. The variable equals 1 when compe
structured in two steps: the screenwriter receives a certain amount for selling the script; and additional payment if the movie is actually made. W
several screenwriter reputation variables. Number Movies measures the number of scripts previously sold by the script’s screenwriter. Experienc
takes the value zero if the screenwriter has not previously sold any script, and 1 otherwise. We also include several variables that try to ca
information or script complexity. Words Logline counts the number of words in the script logline. Soft_Words equals 0 if the script logline contains les
words; 1 if the script logline contains between 21 and 30 words; 2 if the script logline contains between 31 and 40 words; and 3 if the script logline
more than 40 words. Soft_Logmovies equals 1 if the scripts logline refers to any other movie, and 0 otherwise. InfoDummy equals 1 if additional in
about the script is available. We create a script complexity index, Tansparent Script, that equals 1 when the log line contains less than 20 w
Soft_Words equals 0), and additional information about the script is available (i.e. InfoDummy equals 1 ). Soft_Genre equals 1 if the qualified n
genres is greater than 2, and 0 otherwise. The genres and agency variables are dummy variables. Action (Comedy, Drama, Romance, Thriller)
value 1 if the script is classified in the “Action” (Comedy, Drama, Romance, Thriller) category by Spec Screenplay Directory, and 0 otherwise. Mana
the value of 1 if the screenwriter has a manager, and 0 otherwise. We create interaction variables for soft low reputation - soft information. These
identified by Low Rep, take the value of the relevant soft information variable if the screenwriter has not previously sold any script, and 0 o
Compensation, soft information and type of contract data are from the Spec Screenplay Sales Directory. Reputation variables and information
whether the movies has been produced is from IMDB.  t-statistics are in parenthesis.
*,**,*** indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels.
27Produced
Scr Number Movies 0.012* 0.014** 0.015**
(1.6801) (1.9769) (2.0489)
Scr Experienced Writer 0.286***
(3.4830) 0.579**
Scr Nominated Oscar 0.539** 0.627** -2.2922
(2.0782) (2.4647)
Scr Awarded Oscar 0.800*
(1.8929)
Scr Any Nomination 0.559***
(3.3792)
Scr Any Award 0.573** 0.508**
(2.3838) (2.0876)
Low Rep * Log Words -0.008***
(2.9810)
Low Rep * Soft Words -0.067**
(2.1131)
Info Dummy 0.143* 0.149* 0.146*
(1.7062) (1.7733) (1.7355)
Low Rep * Soft Genres -0.146*** -0.157***
(2.7544) (2.8502)
Action 0.037 0.048 0.059 0.133
(0.2620) (0.3423) (0.4287) (0.9438)
Comedy 0.12 0.125 0.088 0.184
(0.7711) (0.8014) (0.5664) (1.1572)
Drama 0.254 0.255 0.229 0.301*
(1.5473) (1.5555) (1.3874) (1.8127)
Romance 0.056 0.051 0.044 0.12
(0.4378) (0.4040) (0.3469) (0.9198)
Thriller -0.008 0.016 -0.007 0.07
(0.0440) (0.0928) (0.0412) (0.3921)
Other 0.351* 0.365* 0.334 0.417**
(1.7006) (1.7764) (1.6266) (2.0125)
Manager -0.333** -0.330** -0.337** -0.288**
(2.5105) (2.5104) (2.5587) (2.2298)
Constant -0.821*** -0.803*** -1.071*** -0.966*** -0.935*** -0.733*** -0.665*** -0.660*** -0.858***
(18.6295) (18.4657) (6.3452) (5.8819) (5.7136) (13.9983) (11.7016) (12.3844) (5.2801)
Observations 1190 1190 1190 1190 1190 1190 1190 1190 1190
Table VI: Probability of Movie Being Produced.
This table reports probit estimates of the decision to produce the movie or not depending on a set of variables that measure screenwriter reputation, script complexity, movie
genre and agency relationships. The dependent variable, Produced, is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the script has been produced or is in production, and 0
otherwise. We include several screenwriter reputation variables. Number Movies measures the number of scripts previously sold by the script’s screenwriter. Experienced
Writer takes the value zero if the screenwriter has not previously sold any script, and 1 otherwise. Nominated Oscar (Awarded Oscar) takes the value 1 if the screenwriter has
been previously nominated to (won) an Oscar. Any Nomination (Any Award) takes the value 1 if the screenwriter has been previously nominated (won) to an award in the
following festivals: Oscars, Golden Globes, British Academy Awards, Emmy Award, European Film Award, Cannes, Sundance, Toronto, Berlin. We also include several
variables that try to capture soft information or script complexity. Words Logline counts the number of words in the script logline. Soft_Words equals 0 if the script logline
contains less than 20 words; 1 if the script logline contains between 21 and 30 words; 2 if the script logline contains between 31 and 40 words; and 3 if the script logline
contains more than 40 words. Soft_Logmovies equals 1 if the scripts logline refers to any other movie, and 0 otherwise. InfoDummy equals 1 if additional information about
the script is available. Soft_Genre equals 1 if the qualifiednumber of genres is greater than 2, and 0 otherwise. The genres and agency variables are dummy variables. Action
(Comedy, Drama, Romance, Thriller) takes the value 1 if the script is classified in the “Action” (Comedy, Drama, Romance, Thriller) category by Spec Screenplay Directory,
and 0 otherwise. Manager takes the value of 1 if the screenwriter has a manager, and 0 otherwise. We create interaction variables for soft low reputation - soft information.
These variables, identified by Low Rep, take the value of the relevant soft information variable if the screenwriter has not previously sold any script, and 0 otherwise.
Compensation, soft information and type of contract data are from the Spec Screenplay Sales Directory. Reputation variables and information regarding whether the movies
has been produced is from IMDB.  t-statistics are in parenthesis.
*,**,*** indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels.
28PG (N = 12) PG-13 (N = 62) R (N = 77)
Average St. Dev. Average St. Dev. Average St. Dev. K-Wallis
Negative Costs 35,100 25,604 40,355 26,796 35,074 29,198 0.2312
Dom. Print & Advertising Costs 24,272 11,219 29,724 9,662 24,441 15,406 0.061
Domestic Gross 68,395 93,205 55,412 50,032 33,368 36,634 0.0017
Domestic Rentals 22,096 21,935 32,421 31,934 17,281 19,142 0.0003
Foreign Gross 59,362 123,182 35,385 48,868 28,187 41,711 0.6878
Foreign Rentals 11,813 13,777 20,093 31,645 12,652 19,043 0.4977
Domestic Video Gross 31,009 23,683 30,681 23,419 17,923 14,295 0.0002
Domestic DVD Gross 12,755 16,800 15,010 26,035 6,676 9,041 0.0027
Total Revenues 163,386 222,384 133,822 122,897 82,862 87,670 0.0019
Rate1 5.98 6.42 3.96 3.37 3.14 4.02 0.009
Rate2 3.36 3.95 1.84 1.21 1.48 1.58 0.0117
Positive Reviews 0.44 0.18 0.25 0.21 0.34 0.24 0.0116
Non-Negative Reviews 0.65 0.11 0.70 0.13 0.72 0.13 0.3706
Total Reviews 31.10 11.71 26.04 12.02 24.57 12.15 0.2512
Starmeter 0.08 0.29 0.71 0.89 0.71 0.97 0.0409
Nominated Oscar 1.67 2.50 1.73 2.61 1.99 3.29 0.8453
Awarded Oscar 0.33 0.89 0.55 1.07 0.55 1.01 0.7104
Any Nomination 12.58 14.69 10.66 11.87 7.53 8.52 0.2778
Any Award 4.50 5.25 3.73 4.78 2.43 3.10 0.1798
Dummy Starmeter 0.08 0.29 0.47 0.50 0.45 0.50 0.041
Dummy Nominated Oscar 0.42 0.51 0.58 0.50 0.45 0.50 0.2782
Dummy Awarded Oscar 0.17 0.39 0.26 0.44 0.29 0.45 0.6785
Dummy Any Nomination 0.75 0.45 0.84 0.37 0.74 0.44 0.3658
Dummy Any Award 0.75 0.45 0.74 0.44 0.64 0.48 0.3678
Table VII: Financial Performance for Different Movie Ratings.
This table compares movie financials, reviews and cast reputation for our sample of produced scripts for which Baseline
FT gathers financial data, based on the movie rating. Total Revenues equals Domestic Gross, Foreign Gross, Domestic
Video Gross and Domestic DVD Gross. Rate1 equals Total Revenues Divided by Negative Costs. Rate2 equals Total
Revenues Divided by Negative Costs plus Domestic Print and Advertising Costs. For each film we gather Variety
Reviews. Each Variety's reviewer grades the movie as positive, negative and mixed. Positive Reviews equals the ratio
between positive reviews and total reviews. Non-negative reviews equals the ratio between positive and mixed reviews
and total reviews. Total reviews equals the total number of reviews. We gather several measures of cast reputation at
the movie level. For each movie, we gather the total number of Oscar and major festival nominations and awards for the
entire cast. We then create a set of dummy variables that equal one if any cast member is defined as a star for each star
definition. Starmeter measures cast reputation following the opinion of IMDb readers. We classify as a star any
actor/actress which in the january prior to the film's release has a starmeter below 150.
290 (N = 70) 1 (N = 81)
Average St. Dev. Average St. Dev. T-test
Negative Costs 33,149 28,748 40,760 26,835 0.048
Dom. Print & Advertising Costs 25,933 14,994 27,189 11,488 0.2813
Domestic Gross 40,686 44,055 49,197 54,520 0.1502
Domestic Rentals 20,578 22,390 26,775 29,011 0.0753
Foreign Gross 29,752 43,365 36,713 62,296 0.2256
Foreign Rentals 13,182 19,790 17,821 28,580 0.1367
Domestic Video Gross 22,120 20,610 26,206 19,982 0.1119
Domestic DVD Gross 8,751 14,206 12,091 21,966 0.1606
Total Revenues 97,132 100,567 121,643 134,953 0.1079
Rate1 3.86 4.60 3.56 3.54 0.3273
Rate2 1.83 2.16 1.73 1.44 0.3752
Positive Reviews 0.32 0.25 0.31 0.22 0.4497
Non-Negative Reviews 0.71 0.14 0.70 0.13 0.3184
Total Reviews 26.52 12.17 24.90 12.06 0.2193
Starmeter 0.63 0.85 0.69 0.97 0.3379
Nominated Oscar 1.56 2.89 2.11 3.01 0.1261
Awarded Oscar 0.40 0.84 0.64 1.14 0.073
Any Nomination 6.93 9.47 11.20 11.24 0.0067
Any Award 2.46 3.62 3.70 4.40 0.0308
Dummy Starmeter 0.43 0.50 0.43 0.50 0.4827
Dummy Nominated Oscar 0.44 0.50 0.56 0.50 0.0847
Dummy Awarded Oscar 0.24 0.43 0.28 0.45 0.2856
Dummy Any Nomination 0.69 0.47 0.86 0.34 0.004
Dummy Any Award 0.60 0.49 0.77 0.43 0.0143
Table VIII: Experienced Screenwriter.
This table compares movie financials, reviews and cast reputation for our sample of produced
scripts for which Baseline FT gathers financial data, based on whether the movie's original
script was the first one sold by the screenwriter. Total Revenues equals Domestic Gross,
Foreign Gross, Domestic Video Gross and Domestic DVD Gross. Rate1 equals Total
Revenues Divided by Negative Costs. Rate2 equals Total Revenues Divided by Negative Costs
plus Domestic Print and Advertising Costs. For each film we gather Variety Reviews. Each
Variety's reviewer grades the movie as positive, negative and mixed. Positive Reviews equals
the ratio between positive reviews and total reviews. Non-negative reviews equals the ratio
between positive and mixed reviews and total reviews. Total reviews equals the total number of
reviews. We gather several measures of cast reputation at the movie level. For each movie,
we gather the total number of Oscar and major festival nominations and awards for the entire
cast. We then create a set of dummy variables that equal one if any cast member is defined as
a star for each star definition. Starmeter measures cast reputation following the opinion of IMDb
readers. We classify as a star any actor/actress which in the january prior to the film's release
has a starmeter below 150.
30All Sample Non Contingent Cont Contingent Contract
Price Price If Made Ratio
Price - All Sample 3.337*** 3.388***
(3.6933) (3.8342)
Price - Cont 0 2.994*** 2.793***
(4.2050) (3.6754)
Price - Cont 1 0.663 4.814
(0.0228) (0.1586)
Priceifmade - Cont 1 -12.652 -12.036
(0.8633) (0.8228)
Ratio - Cont 1 -15,393.15 -15,676.04
(0.9182) (0.9560)
Ln Budget 1 13,966.915** 15,109.056* 16,795.692* 18589.643
(2.3617) (2.0527) (1.8792) (1.5526)
Ln Budget 2 19,426.760*** 28,156.673** 32,867.405** 27,356.245** 24,473.300* 28,295.246**
(2.9979) (2.0831) (2.6048) (2.2936) (1.9031) (2.1851)
PG 41,753.265** 42,304.349** -7477.374 -12161.002 53,176.135* 54,810.807* 53,281.379* 64,326.185** 57,186.550* 66,180.328**
(2.0211) (2.0829) (0.2420) (0.4145) (1.7449) (1.7213) (1.7595) (2.2394) (1.8959) (2.2181)
PG-13 4,781.45 7,888.25 12,683.19 17,309.31 7625.118 7,399.83 4004.122 -6466.789 6,382.20 10,148.62
(0.4574) (0.7386) (1.0017) (1.2748) (0.4866) (0.4539) (0.2557) (0.4259) (0.3939) (0.6392)
Positive Reviews 1831.454 40235.47 28,257.46 33432.884
(0.0581) (0.8574) (0.5744) (0.7433)
NonNegative Reviews -54346.405 -49976.537 -60584.374 -35,523.65 -5194.099 -14733.984
(1.2851) (1.2374) (1.1820) (0.5607) (0.0790) (0.2290)
Total Reviews 647.708 706.675 856.179 961.779 771.01 694.406 676.296 802.172 786.794 869.76
(1.4056) (1.5687) (1.4306) (1.6003) (1.0475) (0.8968) (0.9032) (1.1774) (1.1769) (1.3189)
Seasonal 59,553.335*** 56,467.549*** 63,213.818* 69,975.038** 49,691.718* 63,803.275** 42992.271 41,851.28 47,874.68 45,723.72
(3.0302) (2.9432) (2.0464) (2.2656) (1.7658) (2.2680) (1.5758) (1.4690) (1.6391) (1.5922)
Cast Nominated Oscar -3789.597 -553.363 2,749.55 -1526.74 -2949.846 -6294.686 -2260.054 -1912.779
(1.3053) (0.2557) (0.9418) (0.5380) (1.1190) (1.6055) (0.6881) (0.7138)
Cast Awarded Oscar 6453.782 14496.004
(0.7563) (1.2287)
Cast Any Nomination -107.37 256.095
(0.1419) (0.4042)
Cast Dummy Nominated Oscar -12892.875 -21544.978
(1.0145) (1.1854)
Cast Dummy Awarded Oscar -11285.908
(0.4969)
Cast Dummy Any Nomination -11998.127 -16,647.75 -22871.235
(0.5498) (0.7712) (1.1229)
Cast Dummy Any Award 3513.298 -25775.353
(0.1893) (1.4042)
Constant -121,328.993* -189,063.017** -138287.717 02,465.069** -319,916.301** -207,810.193* -346,809.607**264,125.278* -239286.055 -263,888.378*
(1.6939) (2.4394) (1.7103) (2.2973) (2.2965) (1.8177) (2.6387) (1.8668) (1.5062) (1.6796)
Observations 88 88 34 34 54 54 55 55 56 56
Adjusted R-squared 0.3637 0.3888 0.6197 0.6124 0.2532 0.1934 0.2356 0.246 0.1896 0.2188
Table IX: Domestic Gross
This table reports the OLS estimates of the regression of domestic gross revenues on screenwriter compensation, and a set of control variables that includes movie reviews and cast
reputation. The first two columns report estimates for the for our sample of produced scripts for which Baseline FT gathers financial data. Columns three and four are restricted to scripts in
which a non-contingent contract is offered to the screenwriter. Columns five to ten look at the relationship between movie financials and screenwriter compensation in contingent contracts. In
columns five and six the compensation measure used is the intial payment made to the screenwriter. In columns seven and eight, we use the compensation the screenwriter receives when
the script is made. Finally, columns nine and ten look at the ratio between the compensation when the movie is made and the compensation when the movie is not made. Budget1 equals
Negative Costs. Budget2 Negative Costs plus Domestic Print and Advertising Costs. For each film we gather Variety Reviews. Each Variety's reviewer grades the movie as positive, negative
and mixed. Positive Reviews equals the ratio between positive reviews and total reviews. Non-negative reviews equals the ratio between positive and mixed reviews and total reviews. Total
reviews equals the total number of reviews. We gather several measures of cast reputation at the movie level. For each movie, we gather the total number of Oscar and major festival
nominations and awards for the entire cast. We then create a set of dummy variables that equal one if any cast member is defined as a star for each star definition. Starmeter measures cast
reputation following the opinion of IMDb readers. We classify as a star any actor/actress which in the january prior to the film's release has a starmeter below 150.
31All Sample Non Contingent Cont Contingent Contract
Price Price If Made Ratio
Price - All Sample 9.917*** 9.280***
(4.7122) (4.2317)
Price - Cont 0 8.394*** 8.998***
(3.8560) (4.9192)
Price - Cont 1 31.346 12.524
(0.4467) (0.1826)
Priceifmade - Cont 1 -17.567 -16.779
(0.5127) (0.5014)
Ratio - Cont 1 -33224.04 -26258.354
(0.8992) (0.7075)
Ln Budget 1 43,982.055*** 51,371.121*** 49,045.525** 45,922.332*** 45,884.692*
(3.1926) (3.4663) (2.7969) (2.8571) (1.6803)
Ln Budget 2 71,682.144** 72,507.298** 75,534.527*** 64,591.950** 72,274.662**
(2.3083) (2.5465) (2.7497) (2.2698) (2.4874)
PG 98,971.650** 88,183.557* -49253.239 -26455.874 134,113.167* 138,400.153* 148,771.316** 149,110.031** 144,419.105** 162,511.632**
(2.0567) (1.6743) (0.5801) (0.3681) (1.8584) (2.0040) (2.1423) (2.2954) (2.1776) (2.4565)
PG-13 9,033.75 21,955.10 39970.828 18675.763 7,839.39 -5,679.39 -5,566.41 1,237.46 3818.406 17320.653
(0.3710) (0.8680) (1.1230) (0.4936) (0.2094) (0.1593) (0.1592) (0.0353) (0.1106) (0.4892)
Positive Reviews 75789.372 44480.321 104,972.67
(1.1211) (0.5384) (0.9452)
NonNegative Reviews -154677.985 -192170.748 -107,436.59 -101,642.95 -103,193.21 -60174.819 -122885.761
(1.5702) (1.5281) (0.7426) (0.6871) (0.7272) (0.4155) (0.8280)
Total Reviews 971.579 951.706 1952.615 1483.856 15.264 605.031 971.624 1497.645 1167.331 1082.339
(0.9051) (0.8366) (1.2821) (1.0293) (0.0087) (0.3769) (0.6001) (0.9618) (0.7885) (0.7161)
Seasonal 137,233.299*** 145,005.896*** 159,134.106** 155,735.150** 139,863.363** 117,742.189* 104565.124 104811.509 101254.998 80295.845
(2.9977) (3.1583) (2.2857) (2.3580) (2.1653) (1.7999) (1.5336) (1.6535) (1.5650) (1.2690)
Cast Nominated Oscar -9175.091 -4515.818 -7194.782 -5,242.13 -8330.815
(1.3567) (0.4028) (0.6850) (0.9226) (1.4815)
Cast Awarded Oscar 6,522.86 -15056.208 16592.288 -4597.278
(0.3281) (0.9481) (0.3790) (0.2221)
Cast Any Nomination -797.712 4456.817 -135.43 -328.608 -328.96
(0.5881) (1.0416) (0.0880) (0.1852) (0.2133)
Cast Any Award -14,190.42
(1.3137)
Cast Dummy Starmeter -38451.851
(0.9824)
Cast Dummy Nominated Oscar 34232.866
(0.6673)
Cast Dummy Any Nomination -40254.341 -72282.126
(0.8878) (1.5918)
Cast Dummy Any Award
Constant -355,120.490** -569,414.653*** -581,631.457*** -377,999.241* -509,017.467* -690,973.203* -689,912.274** -704,771.729** -580079.728 -580499.633
(2.1285) (3.7665) (3.0998) (2.0206) (1.9353) (1.9438) (2.0596) (2.2245) (1.6503) (1.6141)
Observations 88 88 34 34 54 54 55 55 56 56
Adjusted R-squared 0.4207 0.4065 0.6299 0.6628 0.1942 0.2317 0.2223 0.2567 0.2376 0.2396
Table X: Total Revenues
This table reports the OLS estimates of the regression of total revenues on screenwriter compensation, and a set of control variables that includes movie reviews and cast reputation. Total Revenues
equals Domestic Gross, Foreign Gross, Domestic Video Gross and Domestic DVD Gross.The first two columns report estimates for the for our sample of produced scripts for which Baseline FT gathers
financial data. Columns three and four are restricted to scripts in which a non-contingent contract is offered to the screenwriter. Columns five to ten look at the relationship between movie financials and
screenwriter compensation in contingent contracts. In columns five and six the compensation measure used is the intial payment made to the screenwriter. In columns seven and eight, we use the
compensation the screenwriter receives when the script is made. Finally, columns nine and ten look at the ratio between the compensation when the movie is made and the compensation when the
movie is not made. Budget1 equals Negative Costs. Budget2 Negative Costs plus Domestic Print and Advertising Costs. For each film we gather Variety Reviews. Each Variety's reviewer grades the
movie as positive, negative and mixed. Positive Reviews equals the ratio between positive reviews and total reviews. Non-negative reviews equals the ratio between positive and mixed reviews and total
reviews. Total reviews equals the total number of reviews. We gather several measures of cast reputation at the movie level. For each movie, we gather the total number of Oscar and major festival
nominations and awards for the entire cast. We then create a set of dummy variables that equal one if any cast member is defined as a star for each star definition. Starmeter measures cast reputation
following the opinion of IMDb readers. We classify as a star any actor/actress which in the january prior to the film's release has a starmeter below 150.
32All Sample Non Contingent Cont Contingent Contract
Price Price If Made Ratio
Price - All Sample 0.001*** 0.001***
(3.2465) (3.6836)
Price - Cont 0 0.001*** 0.001***
(2.5440) (3.7977)
Price - Cont 1 00
(0.3181) (0.1766)
Priceifmade - Cont 1 00
(0.5451) (0.6452)
Ratio - Cont 1 -0.646 -0.508
(1.4217) (1.0983)
Ln Budget 1 -0.004 0.012 -0.162
(0.0230) (0.0618) (0.5052)
Ln Budget 2 0.032 0.052 0.178 0.279 0.354 0.298 0.074
(0.1728) (0.2465) (0.4695) (0.7307) (0.9935) (0.8242) (0.2034)
PG 1.386** 1.572*** 0.048 0.068 1.942** 1.940** 2.183** 2.449*** 1.701* 2.299***
(2.2426) (2.7100) (0.0579) (0.0824) (2.2684) (2.2325) (2.5527) (2.9915) (1.9423) (2.6947)
PG-13 0.26 0.20 0.65 0.393 0.18 0.16 0.16 0.06 0.241 0.079
(0.8627) (0.6644) (1.6101) (1.1307) (0.4182) (0.3525) (0.3670) (0.1388) (0.5386) (0.1802)
Positive Reviews 1.054 0.462 1.53 1.46 0.97 1.73
(1.3192) (0.5364) (1.1568) (1.0767) (0.7650) (1.3380)
NonNegative Reviews -1.2 -1.335 -0.934 -0.091
(1.0403) (0.9635) (0.5231) (0.0497)
Total Reviews 0.012 0.014 0.021 0.021 0.009 0.01 0.013 0.014 0.004 0.016
(0.8834) (1.0999) (1.2834) (1.2700) (0.4502) (0.4018) (0.6107) (0.7278) (0.2017) (0.8162)
Seasonal 1.582*** 1.457*** 1.968** 1.681* 1.278 1.33 1.097 1.202 1.304 1.222
(2.9747) (2.6778) (2.7429) (2.0406) (1.6162) (1.6764) (1.4235) (1.5422) (1.6735) (1.4972)
Cast Nominated Oscar -0.08 -0.054 -0.064 -0.10 -0.144 -0.079
(1.1293) (0.8766) (0.8020) (1.3814) (1.2790) (0.8229)
Cast Awarded Oscar 0.047
(0.1405)
Cast Any Nomination -0.011 -0.008
(0.5955) (0.4049)
Cast Any Award -0.027 -0.125 -0.099 -0.037
(0.5874) (1.5450) (1.3674) (0.5897)
Cast Dummy Nominated Oscar -0.425 -0.729
(1.1701) (1.4284)
Cast Dummy Awarded Oscar 0.661
(1.0139)
Cast Dummy Any Nomination -0.66 -0.798
(1.1283) (1.3883)
Cast Dummy Any Award 0.321 -0.639
(0.6042) (1.1704)
Constant -0.216 0.665 -1.266 0.463 -1.824 -2.673 -3.00 -1.729 2.993 0.595
(0.1211) (0.3005) (0.5486) (0.2100) (0.4662) (0.6858) (0.8073) (0.4152) (0.8208) (0.1319)
Observations 89 89 35 35 54 54 55 55.00 56 56
Adjusted R-squared (0.2866) (0.2832) (0.5024) (0.5036) (0.2245) (0.2113) (0.1927) (0.1679) (0.1956) (0.1525)
Table XI: Rate of Return.
This table reports the OLS estimates of the regression of the films rate of return on screenwriter compensation, and a set of control variables that includes movie reviews and cast reputation. Rate of
return is defined as the ratio between total revenues and negative costs plus print and advertisements costs. The first two columns report estimates for the for our sample of produced scripts for which
Baseline FT gathers financial data. Columns three and four are restricted to scripts in which a non-contingent contract is offered to the screenwriter. Columns five to ten look at the relationship between
movie financials and screenwriter compensation in contingent contracts. In columns five and six the compensation measure used is the intial payment made to the screenwriter. In columns seven and
eight, we use the compensation the screenwriter receives when the script is made. Finally, columns nine and ten look at the ratio between the compensation when the movie is made and the
compensation when the movie is not made. Budget1 equals Negative Costs. Budget2 Negative Costs plus Domestic Print and Advertising Costs. For each film we gather Variety Reviews. Each
Variety's reviewer grades the movie as positive, negative and mixed. Positive Reviews equals the ratio between positive reviews and total reviews. Non-negative reviews equals the ratio between
positive and mixed reviews and total reviews. Total reviews equals the total number of reviews. We gather several measures of cast reputation at the movie level. For each movie, we gather the total
number of Oscar and major festival nominations and awards for the entire cast. We then create a set of dummy variables that equal one if any cast member is defined as a star for each star definition.




Foreign Gross 0.017** 0.024***
(2,2983) (2,9031)




Rate of Return 1 201.950* 217.856*
(1,8128) (1,6894)
Rate of Return 2 941.253*** 975.711***
(3,2199) (2,8248)
Experienced Writer
Number Movies 385.289** 351.962**
(2,1125) (2,0273)
Reputation Movies
Nominated Oscar 6,599.978*** 6,108.459*** 7,098.516***
(3,8844) (3,7292) (4,2276)
Any Nomination 4,572.046*** 4,800.311*** 5,707.279*** 4,670.881***
(3,3497) (3,0801) (3,6529) (3,4538)
Transparent Script 10,625.555*** 10,768.470*** 9,865.486*** 11,266.609*** 11,321.133***
(4,8086) (4,9024) (4,6272) (5,1583) (5,2348)




Constant -956,605 -280,089 -663,674 874,402 -1,001.528* -390,73 1.085,05 -1,295.639* 221,183
(1,5809) (0,5317) (0,9998) (0,7959) (1,7512) (0,6518) (1,0731) (1,9416) (0,2086)
Observations 96 95 95 95 96 97 97 97 97
Adjusted Rsquared (0,3614) (0,3676) (0,1830) (0,0904) (0,4127) (0,3545) (0,1443) (0,3641) (0,1359)
Table XII: Screenwriter Compensation and Future Financial Performance.
This table reports OLS estimates of general compensation regresions on a set of variables that measure screenwriter reputation, script complexity, and different measures of films
financial performance. The dependent variable, Price, reflects the payment made to the screenwriter when he sells the script. In non-contingent contracts, the screenwriter
compensation is fixed (i.e. the screenwriter compensation does not depend on whether the movie is produced or not). In contingent contracts, Price reflects the screenwriter
compensation when the movie is not produced. We include several screenwriter reputation variables. Number Movies measures the number of scripts previously sold by the script’s
screenwriter. Reputation Movies takes the value 0 if the screenwriter has not previously sold any script; 1 if the screenwriter has previously sold between 1 and 3 scripts; 2 if the
screenwriter has previously sold between 4 and 10 scripts; and 3 if the screenwriter has previously sold more than 10 scripts. Experienced Writer takes the value zero if the
screenwriter has not previously sold any script, and 1 otherwise. Nominated Oscar takes the value 1 if the screenwriter has been previously nominated to an Oscar. Any Nomination
takes the value 1 if the screenwriter has been previously nominated to an award in the following festivals: Oscars, Golden Globes, British Academy Awards, Emmy Award, European
Film Award, Cannes, Sundance, Toronto, Berlin. We also include several variables that try to capture soft information or script complexity. Soft_Words equals 0 if the script logline
contains less than 20 words; 1 if the script logline contains between 21 and 30 words; 2 if the script logline contains between 31 and 40 words; and 3 if the script logline contains
more than 40 words. InfoDummy equals 1 if additional information about the script is available. We create a script complexity index, Tansparent Script, that equals 1 when the log
line contains less than 20 words (i.e. Soft_Words equals 0), and additional information about the script is available (i.e. InfoDummy equals 1 ). Compensation, soft information and
type of contract data are from the Spec Screenplay Sales Directory. Reputation variables and information regarding whether the movies has been produced is from IMDB. We
obtain movie financials from Baseline.
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